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Dickinson Law Review
VoL XXXIII

March, 1929

No. 3

A Story*
I have been admonished not to make a speech or an
address or deliver a lecture on any theory of law. One of
your student body, with marked degree of care and filial
devotion, has limited my appearance here this evening to
an informal talk on some practical subject that will be
helpful to students as they graduate and enter the work
of their chosen profession. It must be interesting and not
difficult to digest-in a word, it must be just right, as
your minds are too much occupied during the day to labor
over intricate subjects presented by speakers in the evening. I have been given a very difficult assignment. For,
like the lady who instructed the tailor to make a dress for
her daughter, it must be neither too long nor too shortbut just enough to cover the subject.
I have concluded to tell you a story. The title will
be "Zoning," or "The Story of a Lot of Ground." Its success depends on your knowledge of certain principles, which
find their way into the law, without explanation or elaboration. It will be necessary for you to grasp the legal
situations and quickly frame in your minds the remedy
that you would apply.
The plot of the story, as well as that of ground, is
laid in most any city in the United States. The time is the
present and the actors are yourselves, individually.
John Smith, a graduate of a recognized law school,
Editor of the Law Review, his mind filled with all the
*An address delivered before the Law Society of Harvard Law
School, Monday evening, December 10, 1928,
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knowledge of the law, anxiously waiting for an opportunity
to demonstrate his complete mastery of its intricate deThere
tails, started west to locate in the City of G-, I-.
lie intended to open an office and practice his profession.
On reaching this city, where he was acquainted, he applied
for admission to the bar to the local examining board
for the county, and was referred to the state board, where
he successfully passed the state bar examinations, and on
presentation of his certificate from the state board, was
duly admitted to the county bar. Having located an office,
and being possessed of a comparatively small sum of money,
he decided to invest it in a venture that was reasonably
sure, not likely to depreciate quickly in value and would
yield an income sufficient to pay the carrying charges
and enable him to pass through the dark period of early
professional life. Accordingly he concluded his best chance
Iay in purchasing a lot of ground; with his ready cash he
would pay the purchase price, or part of it, and with the
aid of borrowed capital complete the purchase and erect a
building. He expected, with good reason, that the revenue
from the rest would produce sufficient to meet his requiremients.
After visiting various sections of the city, he selected
an inoffensive lot of ground, situated well within city lines.
Ascertaining that the lot was owned by the estate of James
Jones, and that John Slick, a realtor, was to make the sale
as agent for the estate, Smith got in touch with Slick,
made known his wishes, told him substantially all he intended to do, and inquired concerning the price of the
lot. He was informed by the agent the price was $50,000,
of which $20,000 would be required as hand-money, the
balance to be paid when the deal was closed. Also, that
the title was good and there were no encumbrances against
the lot. Twenty thousand dollars represented all the money
Smith had. In order to complete his arrangement, secure
the balance of the money and build, Snmith must arrange for
the necessary funds through a loan. This he arranged
through a trust company; it had a department which loaned
money as needed for building operations, the procedure
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being to record the agreement, thus fixing the rights of
the parties through the record notice, the trust company
to advance the money as needed, placing a supervisor over
the work and the trust company making directly all disbursements. Thereafter, a first mortgage covering completed building and property was to be given.
Smith returned to the agent, and an agreement was
entered into by which Smith agreed to buy and Slick.
agent for the estate, agreed to sell the land to him "in fee
simple, clear of all encumbrances," with a warranty of
title. Slick was to furnish an abstract of title which would
be subject to the approval of Smith, and if there were any
encumbrances affecting the marketability of the land,
Smith could disaffirm the sale and the hand-money was to
be returned to him with interest, together with any expense connected with the purchase. It was stipulated that
the deferred payment should be due one year thence, and
bear interest. This gave Smith ample time to complete
his project.
Shortly after the agreement was executed, Smith was
furnished an abstract of title. Wishing to be careful, he
proposed to check up the abstractor's work and verify his
fee simple holding. As there was no title-examining company in that city or county, and as he did not care to disclose his unfamiliarity with such work, he did not hire a
lawyer familiar with the subject; having implicit confidence
in his own legal ability, he undertook the task of checking
up the abstract himself.
He went to the recorder's office, where deeds are
recorded, and carefully examined all the deeds from grantors back to the Commonwealth; this search included in the
line of title all wills, proceedings in the orphans' court,
register of wills or probate, or other courts having control
of the administration of estates. Through the recitals in
the deeds and proceedings in court he found words necessary to convey a fee simple title to the land from the Commonwealth to the present grantor. There were no reservations or exceptions, and, as far as this record title disclosed,
Smith was getting a fee.
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He then looked for mortgages, examining carefully the
index of mortgages to ascertain if any grantor had given
a mortgage that had not been paid, or, being paid, not
marked satisfied. Not finding any, he looked for judgments, examining the judgment docket to find if there were
any unsatisfied judgments which had been entered against
any grantor within the statutory period. A search back ten
years did not reveal any. The municipal lien docket was
then examined to ascertain if the city, within ten years
or so, had constructed any sewers, paved the street or laid
any water lines in front of his property, the cost of which
may be imposed upon the abutting property owner, and a
lien for that cost entered in this docket. Discovering
none, the tax lien docket or the tax office was next examined. He found no taxes assessed against the property
unpaid, and the property in the hands of any grantor had
not been sold for taxes unpaid. Smith then wrote the
United States Federal Court for the district in which the
land was located for a list of liens against his grantor or
grantors for the last ten years. He found none. There
was no such thing as a title insurance company in G-,
hence the title could not be insured.
Having made what he conceived to be a careful examination of the title, he proposed to go ahead with his
deal, fully satisfied that he had not disappointed his legal
education in the comprehensive examination of the title.
Plans and specifications were prepared by an architect for
a four story building to contain storerooms and apartments,
which would completely cover his lot, and a contract was
let for excavating for the foundation. Workmen for the
contractor went on the ground and started work. They
had scarcely started when the corner policeman demanded
from the foreman his permit to build; he was referred to
Smith, the owner. The officer soon located Smith, who
was not as yet submerged with legal business, and asked
for the permit. "Permit! Permit for what?" asked Smith.
"Why, a permit to erect your building on this lot." "I
didn't know I had to get a permit." "Yes," said the officer,
"you must have a permit, and each policeman is required

-
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to report building operations in his district and see the
permit. You better go down to City Hall; if you are entitled to a permit, you will get it." Smith at school had
heard something of permits, but there was drifting in his
mind the idea that his agreement gave him fee simple ownership; therefore, the need of a permit had not occurred
to him. But, out of deference to the constituted authorities, he visited City Hall and asked the heaal of the Bureau
of Building for a permit. By questioning, the officer learned that he owned a lot of ground 40 x 150, and wished to
erect a combination store-room and apartment-house covering the lot, the plans of which he exhibited. "Oh," said
that good-natured official, "you must see the Zoning
Board." Smith was annoyed. He knew through independent examination at school that a Zoning Board had something to do with land in cities. He reflected there are so
many subdivisions of subjects in the law's compass it was
impossible to acquire through study a detailed knowledge
of each one and came to realize that the law school merely
opens the door through which graduates may pass, equipped with a general scientific knowledge that leads to a
discovery of the law on a given state of facts.
However, believing it to be a mere matter of form, he
applied to the Zoning Board for authority to build. He
made known his ownership of the lot, street and number
of the location, and his contemplated purpose. He produced his plans, and the board refused the application to
build for the reason that this lot was in a residential district which did not permit, first, a combination store and
dwelling-house on any lot; second, any building to occupy
the entire lot of land. In vain did Smith insist that his lot
for residence purposes was worth less than the hand-money
paid, and, if the decision of the board stood, he was ruined;
that in the same block on the same side of the street
there was a store, and within a short distance a larger
apartment house. Why, he argued, could he not build on
a lot owned in fee, without reservation or exception, on
which he had been taught he could build anything so long
as he did not harm his neighbor? For answer, the presi-
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dent of the board handed Smith a copy of the Zoning
ordinance.
He read the ordinance, but was too much distracted
to understand it. He did discover from the Zoning map
that his lot was located in the "C" residential district, which
permitted a one-family residence to be built, or a church or
a library, with. certain restrictions as to these buildings.
But why could he not, in the same street, do as others
had done? After some thought, he controlled his pride
and did as many other lawyers had done, and what is
always a good thing for any young lawyer to do, consulted
an older lawyer, Mr. X, a middle-aged man of wide experience, a kindly gentleman interested in young men. To
him the story was told. Smith admitted he knew little or
nothing of the zoning law, its origin, purpose, effect or
practice under it. In fact, he did what every client should
do--told his counsel everything about his case.
"Is there any relief under the circumstances of my
case?" asked Smith. "Why should owners," he continued,
"be needlessly harassed in the use of land owned in fee?"
"What is the zoning law anyway, and why should the State
permit cities to pass ordinances affecting the use of land?
I thought the government couldn't take your property without paying for it."
"Well, my boy," said his friend, "zoning laws relate
only to cities or congested centers of population; fifty
years ago there was apparently no necessity for them. It
is quite true in that period, under the plan of municipal
aesthetics, there was an effort to discourage unsightly
things, and a belief that 'outward beauty was but a manifestation of inward grace!' But no zoning law or government interference through a systematic regulation was
ever attempted, and if it had been attempted, the courts
would have condemned them. Its coming had been anticipated, to some extent, by many laws affecting certain uses
of property, such as the writ of injunction and the law
of nuisances, as you know; but these were wholly inadequate for the broad scope these new general regulations
assumed under present-day legislation.
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"As time advanced, and civilization marched forward
with rapid stride, industry, science and art progressed beyond the wildest dream of those who presided over our
destinies fifty years ago. The inevitable followed. Industrial concerns, because of the availability of labor,
centered in cities, it industry itself was not iresponsible ior
such cities. This growth caused large numbers of our
rural population, as well as the influx of foreign immigrants, to congregate in such centers. Business pushed forward, crowding house-owners or making their residences
unusable as homes. Industrial and business places spotted
the territory used for residence purposes, causing much
annoyance and discomfort to these owners, as well as loss
of property value. Traffic on the streets became more and
more difficult to move. The great congestion and impediment to traffic came not only from industry, but from
the modern huge office buildings, the modern apartmenthouse and the introduction of the automobile. The difficulty of obtaining proper police protection from crime,
proper sanitation, the increase in fire hazard, the danger
to pedestrians, the impossibility of securing convenient or
fairly comfortable homes in which working people might
live-all these created such a disturbance in city life, as
made it imperative for the government no longer to view
with indifference the tribulations of city life; it became a
matter of great concern to the security of the state."
"All this may be true," said Smith, "but why not
let the people provide their own remedy, as they have been
doing for a hundred years?"
"No private person," continued Mr. X, "or combination
of persons, could undertake or impose regulations that
would bring about satisfactory results in city life. In spots
land might be conveyed subject to building and other restrictions, but these are soon lost sight of or their abuse
makes them of no value. The law of injunction or nuisance was inadequate. Even if private persons had a
limited power to regulate, they could not insure the quality
of regulation, and where individual effort is concerned, it
is always met with fierce conflict from others. This mass
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of population having come together as a community, each
of its members must place his individual fortune with the
mass; the government alone can give relief and make
effective the protection necessary to the situation. If it
neglects to do what it should do, it cripples the well-being
and improvement of the community as a whole.
"The government must depend on the common sense
of the community to aid in its interference in the use of
property. Of course, it is not to be forgotten that the
immense desire of people is to act as freely as possible,
but this desire must be subjected to an undoubted right in
the government to regulate for the best interest of the
great majority. As a rule, people do not like to lose their
freedom of action, even if it is for their own good.
"Having this situation confronting it, it became necessary for the government to devise some means to protect the residence owner, insure the continued growth of
the city along industrial lines, gradually build up the health
of the community, and secure a more general welfare and
greater- safety to the public. For illustration, take the
modern office building of today, fifteen or twenty stories
high, with a population in it equaling a small-sized borough;
from twenty-five hundred to six thousand persons are employed in each building; at the noon hour all of these, within
a very short space of time, are precipitated onto the highway. If two or more of these buildings are close together
as you find them, the demand on the highway is only
intensified; you have within a few blocks a small city.
All this concentration of people must be at the expense of
health, safety and general welfare."
Here Smith interjected, but his friend stopped him.
"You are going to say you cannot, by these laws, stop business and industrial development. Why not let the gradual
development take care of itself, as it has done in the past?
You might do this, of course, but the development since
the late war has been so great that customary growth and
advance cannot keep step with what you term normal readjustments. Then zoning regulations systematize de-
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velopment, cause a minimum of loss in property value, and
secure many other benefits meanwhile."
"But this is nothing more than rankest paternalism in
government," shouted Smith. "Quite true, quite true; you
may say so; but this is not our first embarkation in
paternalism, you must remember. We have enacted laws
to cure certain phases of social injustice. In the field of industry, the state requires guard-rails about majhinery for
the protection of workmen; it has promulgated rules for
the relief and care of those engaged in mining coal; it forbids the employment of children under a certain age; makes
compulsory compensation to injured workmen; limits the
hours of labor and regulates the price and character of
service to be furnished by our great public utilities. These
laws forecast just such regulation as zoning laws, and the
end of paternalism is not yet. These regulations are enforced through commissions or departments; they are undoubtedly parental efforts of government, and they may, as
you say, come from an excess of affection of the governing authorities." "All they do is to establish bureaucracies
in government," sullenly rejoined Smith. "Not quite, but
close to it," said Mr. X.
"Let me repeat, zoning legislation is for the purpose
of lessening congestion in streets, securing greater safety
from fire hazards, panic and other dangers, providing more
light and air to the resident owner, preventing overcrowding of land, facilitating transportation, providing suitable
homes for working people, preventing unnecessary noises
and spreading of noxious odors, gases or smoke. It reduces
street accidents by segregation of building and industry,
affords more adequate police protection and stabilizes
property values. I don't pretend it does all this automatically, but these are put forward by the proponents of
this legislation as the ultimate end of the acts. They are
to be worked out through the common sense and good
judgment of the people entrusted with their administration. "Well," said Smith, "how is it brought about, say,
here in C-?"
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"The legislature passes an act authorizing cities having
a given population to enact a zoning ordinance. You must
remember, of course, that this power is not exercised under
the theory of eminent domain. Under that power a city
may build parks, memorial halls, monuments and highways,
widen streets for traffic and build ornamental court-yards,
playgrounds and the like, but it has to pay for the taking;
nor is the authority under the taxing power, though the
money of ,the taxpayer is used for eminent domain or
aesthetic purposes. But much that has been accomplished
through taxation and eminent domain is used as a reason
to justify zoning laws. As I have stated, the authority
comes through an exertion of the police power in the interest of health, safety and general welfare.
In the last twelve years, the legislatures of forty-three
states have enacted zoning laws, and 459 cities having a
population of more than 30,000,000, have been zoned. Many
of the states have adopted the standard zoning act of the
department of commerce at Washington.
"After the legislature delegates the necessary power,
the city enacts a zoning ordinance, as G- did. Its zoning
ordinance divides the land within it into districts, called 'use
districts,' because the property in the particular section,
usually between given streets, can be used only for designated purposes. There are three general divisions for
which land may be used: residence, business or commercial
and industrial. Residence districts are further subdivided
into three sub-districts, say A, B and C, and each of these
district classifications specifies the character of building
to be placed therein, running from an apartment-house and
store to a one-family residence. Business or commercial
districts are again subdivided, and the uses to which land
therein may be put are enumerated in the act. There is
quite a list of them. The third, or industrial, is usually
divided into light manufacturing and heavy manufacturing.
There is a fourth classification which some cities adopt
where there is no restricted section; you can build anything
therein. These divisions are merely illustrations, naturally;
each city has its own forms. A map of the city shows the
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lines of these various districts. The ordinance cannot make
arbitrary divisions into the classes named, you understand,
but you may have the same class in different parts of the
city. Mr. Smith, your lot is located in Residence District
'C'; you may go out a mile and quite possibly find a similar
district 'C'. Between the two may be Residence District
'B' or some other districts.
"In addition to the classifications mentioned, you have
two others that cover all districts. These classifications
limit the height in feet and bulk of the building and the area
of ground that it may cover or that must surround it. You
can build on your lot, Mr. Smith, in the 'C' district, a singlefamily dwelling covering not over 40 per cent. of the
surface. You must leave so many feet in front, on the
sides and in the rear; that is, area. You find this defined by
set-back lines, meaning the house must be set back so many
feet from the street, or referred to as front-yard cases."
"But look here", said the younger man; "there is a
store on the same block and an apartment-house that is
larger than the one I want to build. What right have they
to allow them to do what I can't do?"
"Let's see," said his friend; "you want to build in residence district 'C' a combination apartment-house and storeroom four stories high, covering the entire lot. The ordiance forbids that erection. Notwithstanding the ordinance,
you claim an unjust classification as it relates to your particular lot of ground, because in the same block, facing the
same street as your lot, there are buildings being used for
store-room and apartment-house purposes. These were
built and so used before the adoption of the ordinance. Is
that the case? Well, this presents a serious question. and,
so far as I am informed, it has not been decided in our
state."
"Yes," exclaimed Smith; "what can I do about it?"
"Your next step is an appeal to the Zoning Board of
Appeals. This is the body the legislature has created to
safeguard individual rights by providing a quick, convenient
remedy against an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the
police power in specific cases. Its function is to see if the
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action of the zoning board was reasonable. An appeal to
that body is your only remedy. I may observe that the decision of the Euclid case, in the United States Supreme
Court, settles the constitutional question of zoning laws as
a structural measure. It holds zoning laws are lawful exertions of the police power by the state. But there is this
important distinction which seems to have been lost sight
of. That court did not declare each zoning law, in detail,
constitutional or every decision under the zoning law. Each
case must be left to its particular facts to stand the test of
constitutionality. Now your case presents special facts. Go
to the Board of Appeals; I wish you luck. Good day."
Then, under his own breath, "The impetuousness of youth
and education; they will wander into dark places without a
chaperon."
Smith took an appeal to the board, basing his right on
an unreasonable exercise of police power, particularly the
equality clause of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The board held that other buildings coming
under what is styled "nonconforming uses in a district," or
uses forbidden by the ordinance, are none the less lawful
and may be continued if such uses were in existence before
the adoption of the ordinance. Their opinion went on to
say that such right in favor of another owner in the same
district was not a discrimination or illegal classification that
would condemn the ordinance, and the mere fact these uses
still continued did not prevent the enforcement of the zoning ordinance as regards future uses of the rest of the land
in the district. Finally, they held the limitation on height
and vacant area to surround the building was not unreasonable, and appellant Smith, having bought his lot with full
knowledge, as he was presumed to have, that the zoning
law embraced his lot, could not complain of any of these
restrictions or of a loss in value. Smith, believing the
classification unfair, carried his appeal to the Supreme
Court and lost. That court sustained the action of the
board.
Smith was now assuredly in a sorry plight. His
troubles had multiplied. Apparently, he had a useless lot
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on his hands, a claim against him by the contractor and
another claim by the trust company that had agreed to
furnish the money. He went to see Slick, the agent for
the estate, the man who sold him the lot, and told him his
troubles, but the agent's name did not belie his character.
Smith must pay the price. It was worse than ruin, and
Slick, the agent, was ready to close the deal, or close in on
Smith as the final payment date was fast approaching.
The business of the law had not assumed such flattering proportions as Smith had dreamed about while at school.
He had used all his money and borrowed to take his appeal
and now conduct his litigation. He had no other source of
income. Yet Smith was a born fighter. He would not
give up. No true lawyer ever gives up when in the losing
stream of a contest if there is the slightest hope for ultimate success. In the clearness of desperation, this thought
struck him: "I was to get a fee simple title, free of encumbrances, from Slick. Why is the zoning ordinance
not an encumbrance on my title?" The more he thought
of the proposition the stronger it became imbedded in his
mind. After again consulting his lawyer friend, he concluded that he would cancel the agreement, demand a return
of the hand-money from Slick, and damages on account of
the contract, to be measured by the cost of his breach with
the trust company and with the excavation men. He soon
ascertained from his contractor and the trust officer what
sum of money would compensate them for the loss of their
contracts, and, in each case, it did not exceed their actual
expenses. He then went to the agent's office and demanded
from Slick the return of the hand-money, as well as payment of the damages he had sustained. This, of course, was
refused. His next step was to force Slick's hand by instituting a bill in equity to cancel the contract, and, as incidental relief, to compel the return of the purchase price
paid. The decedent of the estate for which Slick had been
agent, had lived in Pennsylvania, and the executors were
domiciled in Pittsburgh; so Smith, not wishing to take any
chances on the question of service, went to Pittsburgh and
entered suit. There he engaged legal counsel of note, and
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a bill for cancellation of the contract was duly filed. It
averred the contract and the failure of the defendants to
perform their part of it, inasmuch as they were not able to
give a fee simple, because of the encumbrance in the shape
of a zoning ordinance; that Slick, as agent, had also misrepresented the facts that led up to Smith's engagement in
the contract with respect to the condition of the title; and
that the ordinance was an encumbrance affecting the title.
He prayed for cancellation of the agreement, the return
of the hand-money and the repayment of such expenses as
he would be compelled to pay out, and such further relief
as the court might think proper. The answer of the executors of the estate admitted Slick's authority to make the
contract, denied that the title was not in fee or that there
was any encumbrance affecting the title as such. And to
complicate matters, they filed a cross-bill, averring that
Smith had entered into a contract with them by which he
had agreed to buy the land, that they were ready to perform and give him a deed as called for by that contract.
They prayed for a decree of specific performance, as the
settlement date had passed since Smith instituted his bill
for cancellation. To this cross-bill an answer was filed,
denying their right to specific performance. A hearing took
place before a judge, sitting as a chancellor, where considerable evidence was taken. The details of the transaction, by the testimony there adduced, were clearly outlined to the trial court. The dark cloud of defeat again
hung over Smith. The trial court decided that, while the
zoning ordinance materially restricted the use of the land
and was undoubtedly an encumbrance, it was not such an
encumbrance as affected a fee simple grant. In other words,
if A contracts with B to convey a fee, the existence of such
ordinance would not destroy or injure the availability of the
title as a fee. This was so decided because the zoning ordinance was of such public nature that its successful execution should not be impeded by technical rules of law. They
also held the title was a fee, denied Smith's right to the
return of the purchase money he had paid and ordered him
to complete his purchase price, a thing utterly impossible
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under the circumstances, as Smith could not raise the
money. Smith unable to comply with this decree, believed
his failure would be such a contempt that would mean his
incarceration in jail. He was more agitated than ever, but
he was reassured by associates in Pittsburgh that in those
states which did not recognize imprigonment for debt no
imprisonment would follow his failure to comply with the
order. A more serious proposition was the final determination of the legal question. Accordingly, an appeal to the
Supreme Court was their final and only hope.
The case was set for argument in the Western District
of that state, and was heard by that court shortly after the
appeal was taken. The point stressed at argument was
that the title was not a fee simple because the zoning ordinance was a cloud on the title. During the argument it
developed from the testimony before the chancellor that
when Smith went to Slick, the agent, and told him his
desire, Slick knew the lot for residence purposes was not
worth over $20,000; for this reason he asked that sum as
hand-money. For business purposes, the lot was worth
$50,000. He also admitted that, as a lawyer, he had heard
of the zoning decisions in other states and knew that this
lot was in a district that did not permit Smith to build a
store-room and apartment-house. But, as there were other
buildings in that use, Smith might obtain a permit for his
building from the Zoning Board. Of this Slick was doubtful. At any rate, he was not called on to tell him. His
commission was 5 per cent. of the purchase price. The
lower court held this not fraud in law.
The seven justicds, during the argument. showed by
questions they had a sympathetic feeling for Smith and
believed he had been badly overreached by his fellowlawyer. They indicated the lower court's conclusion with
respect to the zoning ordinance might be correct. Accordingly, as is their practice, the Chief Justice turned the case
over to one of the judges for a very close examination, with
instructions to report back to the court with his opinion
covering the matter. A very careful study of the case was
made, and a curious thing in connection with the contract
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attracted the judge's attention. It was a new idea in con.
nection with the case, as it was a new point in law. He
decided to write his report and to submit to the court his
view of this new proposition. The contract provided for a
fee simple title, and evidently it was in fee. It provided,
further, that an abstract of title should be submitted to
Smith, and he was to approve it. The abstract had been
submitted to Smith, and-he approved it. Then the agreement contained this peculiar language: If there were any
encumbrances affecting the marketability of the land which
Smith could not approve, he could disaffirm the title. Smith,
held the court, by agreement of the parties, was to act in
the capacity of an arbitrator, an umpire or a judge, whose
decision on this question was to be final, so far as the
purchase of this property was concerned. In deciding
whether there were encumbrances, Smith was not held to
record encumbrances, as such; the agreement did not so
provide. Anything dehors the record that affected the land
could be so considered. Of course, he could not act capriciously or without just cause; he could not report as encumbrances matters that clearly did not exist and which
were not of that character. The vendor was required to
furnish, not only a good title, but one within the terms of
the contract. Did the estate do this?
Said the court: "The land was to be in 'fee simple,' and
if there were 'liens or encumbrances affecting the marketability of the land', the title was to be disapproved. In
other words, if Smith found encumbrances that had a tendency to affect the sale of the land, he could cancel the
agreement. The question, then, was not merely whether
the zoning ordinance affected the title, though, as an encumbrance on the title, it would undoubtedly result in a
failure to secure the land's market value, but the clause in
the contract must be ascertained by considering the extent
this zoning ordinance affected the marketability of the land.
Would it have a tendency to impair the sale value of the
land? Smith's evidence showed that it did to the extent
of $30,000. The contract under consideration did not make
the court below nor this court the judge to decide that
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question. Smith was to do that. Not marketability of
the title as a fee, but marketability of the land was affected
by the zoning ordinance. The court below was right in
saying that ordinarily a zoning ordinance would not be an
encumbrance on the title, and under the circumstances surrounding the land in question it was not such an encumbrance as would affect the fee quality of the land; but Smith
was not to decide that question, but whether the zoning
ordinance affected the marketability of the land itself.
Marketability of the land has a wider signification than
marketability of title-a question so often passed upon by
the courts of every State. Smith's decision on this question, made in good faith, presented an insuperable barrier
against the defendants' securing specific performance of
this contract. The parties had solemnly agreed that Smith
should be the sole person to decide that question. By his
bill for cancellation of the contract, his undisputed notification to the agent, he has decided the question. He has performed his duty as an arbitrator, and Slick's testimony on
cross-examination clearly sustained his decision. He demands cancellation and a return of the purchase price paid
by him, with expenses. He should receive both. The judgment of the court below is reversed, and it is ordered that
a decree be entered annulling and cancelling the contract,
and that the defendant be ordered to pay to Smith $20,000,
with interest from the date that it was received, and in
addition the sum of $5,000 to cover all necessary expenses
incurred on account of the contract."
And Smith got his money back.
JOHN W. KEPHART
Ebensburg, Penna.

